Are you sure about this?? This is quite the risky claim and I've heard evidence to the contrary. Sidechannel attacks can be performed in noisy environments.
ECDSA Key Extraction from Mobile Devices via Nonintrusive Physical Side Channels
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/2976749.2978353
> "We demonstrate full extraction of ECDSA secret signing keys from OpenSSL and CoreBitcoin running on iOS devices, and partial key leakage from OpenSSL running on Android and from iOS's CommonCrypto."
ECDH Key-Extraction via Low-Bandwidth Electromagnetic Attacks on PCs
https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/129
> "By measuring the target's electromagnetic emanations, the attack extracts the secret decryption key within seconds, from a target located in an adjacent room across a wall. " (PC)
Hertzbleed
https://www.hertzbleed.com/
> "In the worst case, these attacks can allow an attacker to extract cryptographic keys from remote servers that were previously believed to be secure." (Server, remote)
RSA Key Extraction via Low-Bandwidth Acoustic Cryptanalysis
https://cs-people.bu.edu/tromer/papers/acoustic-20131218.pdf
> "a new acoustic cryptanalysis key extraction attack, applicable to
GnuPG’s current implementation of RSA. The attack can extract full 4096-bit RSA decryption keys from laptop computers (of various models), within an hour, using the sound generated by the computer during the decryption of some chosen ciphertexts." (PC, low bandwidth signal)
These demonstrate attacks in low signal-to-noise environments and at a distance (remotely), can both be overcome.
nick
npub1j8…g26k2
2026-05-01 01:56:35 UTC
in reply to nevent1q…vn4y
Author Public Key
npub1j8d6h8mzvc8f2fvysrf09nlkmn7m2ylj32zl5na4tm5e8fd5dqysrg26k2Seen on
wss://relay.mostr.pubPublished at
2026-05-01 01:56:35 UTCEvent JSON
{
"id": "9db47e7538dc43eaf8435286ccd10b44443f0b867ec1cf74abfb49cdfa4bb82a",
"pubkey": "91dbab9f62660e95258480d2f2cff6dcfdb513f28a85fa4fb55ee993a5b46809",
"created_at": 1777600595,
"kind": 1,
"tags": [
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],
[
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"",
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],
[
"p",
"460c25e682fda7832b52d1f22d3d22b3176d972f60dcdc3212ed8c92ef85065c",
"wss://nostr.wine/"
],
[
"p",
"40b9c85fffeafc1cadf8c30a4e5c88660ff6e4971a0dc723d5ab674b5e61b451",
"wss://nos.lol/"
],
[
"p",
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"wss://relay.primal.net/"
],
[
"r",
"wss://nostr-pub.wellorder.net/"
],
[
"r",
"wss://relay.nostr.info/"
],
[
"r",
"wss://relay.mostr.pub/"
],
[
"r",
"wss://relay.0xchat.com/"
],
[
"r",
"wss://relay.damus.io/"
],
[
"r",
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],
[
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],
[
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],
[
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],
[
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]
],
"content": "Are you sure about this?? This is quite the risky claim and I've heard evidence to the contrary. Sidechannel attacks can be performed in noisy environments.\n\n\nECDSA Key Extraction from Mobile Devices via Nonintrusive Physical Side Channels\nhttps://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/2976749.2978353\n\u003e \"We demonstrate full extraction of ECDSA secret signing keys from OpenSSL and CoreBitcoin running on iOS devices, and partial key leakage from OpenSSL running on Android and from iOS's CommonCrypto.\"\n\nECDH Key-Extraction via Low-Bandwidth Electromagnetic Attacks on PCs\nhttps://eprint.iacr.org/2016/129\n\u003e \"By measuring the target's electromagnetic emanations, the attack extracts the secret decryption key within seconds, from a target located in an adjacent room across a wall. \" (PC)\n\nHertzbleed\nhttps://www.hertzbleed.com/\n\u003e \"In the worst case, these attacks can allow an attacker to extract cryptographic keys from remote servers that were previously believed to be secure.\" (Server, remote)\n\nRSA Key Extraction via Low-Bandwidth Acoustic Cryptanalysis\nhttps://cs-people.bu.edu/tromer/papers/acoustic-20131218.pdf\n\u003e \"a new acoustic cryptanalysis key extraction attack, applicable to\nGnuPG’s current implementation of RSA. The attack can extract full 4096-bit RSA decryption keys from laptop computers (of various models), within an hour, using the sound generated by the computer during the decryption of some chosen ciphertexts.\" (PC, low bandwidth signal)\n\nThese demonstrate attacks in low signal-to-noise environments and at a distance (remotely), can both be overcome.",
"sig": "57345ded208232595a74f1d75f76c619556317915756a14553d88bca7eee90c37a3dc40abf755c2be013e5e1eb6615d9a85772a109c0de3ea412e259edbe574b"
}