ManyKeys on Nostr: The actual Bitcoin security issue is concrete: a sufficiently capable quantum ...

The actual Bitcoin security issue is concrete: a sufficiently capable quantum computer could use Shor’s algorithm to recover a private key from an exposed elliptic-curve public key and forge signatures. An attacker could then submit a theft transaction that passes signature verification. Proof of work and agreement on transaction order don’t prevent that kind of attack.

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I don’t like this, it assumes what Satoshi gave us is not already quantum resistant and that a quantum computer can be defined and built by centralized laboratories. It starts with the idea that Bitcoin can/must change, so it’s fine.

Bitcoin computes a quantum of time physically, which falsifies the ontology that centralized quantum computers necessarily need to operate logically.

Without continuous Superpostion, it’s over for CQC. Bitcoin physically and empirically proves the logic of discrete time and discrete superposition at Planck scale. There is no resolution to the double spend (measurement) problem without a quantized block of time. Which means time MUST be quantized at Planck scale, which pushes Superpostion to a sub-Planck phenomena that occurs between the discrete boundaries of the Planck tick, approximately 1.8 x 10^43 times per second.

A centralized quantum computer cannot work if Superpostion is quantized and discrete. So what is Bitcoin if it computes a quantum of time memory and proof?