AI analysis:
Read through joinstr-ark by /dev/fd0 (nprofile…79xu) : a coinjoin of Ark VTXOs using bark + rust-joinstr. Peers meet in a joinstr nostr pool, then submit every input and output as one delegated round participation on an unmodified Bark server. It ran on signet against Second's server.
https://gitlab.com/1440000bytes/joinstr-ark
Good:
- Only an aggregate round output hits the chain. No coinjoin fingerprint for chain analysis.
- The server pays mining fees, so small amounts are viable. Mixing rides on the VTXO refresh you need anyway.
- The coordinator can't steal. Inputs sign over the full output list, and outputs are hash-locked to one preimage that is only released once the server has every forfeit.
Tradeoffs vs WabiSabi:
- The adversary changes. The Ark server sees the arkoor graph: the input's history (including the split to an exact denomination) and every later spend of the output. The mix only hides which input became which output.
- Whirlpool-shaped: fixed denomination, 1 input / 1 output, no change. The anonset is the peers in one participation.
- Outputs are registered before inputs, and anyone with the pool key can post one, so DoS is free. A peer withholding its forfeit forces honest peers into an on-chain exit. In WabiSabi a failed round costs nothing and bad UTXOs get banned.
- Network privacy needs Tor with isolated circuits to both the server and the relay. That's not in the demo yet, and the author says so.
- Small fixes: forfeit bundles aren't verified and the last one wins, and the first unlock-hash message wins. Either lets a pool member force a failed round. Griefing, not theft.
Where I'd like to see it go: WabiSabi over Ark. Credentials from registered VTXO inputs, outputs registered over separate Tor identities, and the Ark refresh pays the bill. Great proof of concept.
kevinrav / Kevin Ravens₿erg ⚡️ ☁️
npub1yn…9xgfl
2026-10-03 18:16:26 UTC
in reply to nevent1q…em2u
Author Public Key
npub1yn84ur49llj7pp9a7uv477f7vrpj0rj7df5pnfncvkusaxgy6jqsj9xgflPublished at
2026-10-03 18:16:26 UTCEvent JSON
{
"id": "ef84aae7f0d28fb7d66423d00b305d921cf18594e7402eba4694e8e73258a2c2",
"pubkey": "24cf5e0ea5ffe5e084bdf7195f793e60c3278e5e6a6819a67865b90e9904d481",
"created_at": 1791051386,
"kind": 1,
"tags": [
[
"p",
"6681268ace4748d41a4cfcc1e64006fb935bbc359782b3d9611f64d51c6752d9",
"wss://nos.lol/",
"mention"
],
[
"e",
"53a2e8206fcb11b523c1931e41149ba645ccbfa1c84249dbcbb2216b29f6f54a",
"",
"root"
],
[
"r",
"wss://relay.azzamo.net/"
],
[
"r",
"wss://relay.wasabiwallet.io/"
],
[
"r",
"wss://nos.lol/"
],
[
"r",
"wss://relay.noderunners.network/"
],
[
"r",
"wss://relay.primal.net/"
],
[
"client",
"Primal Web"
]
],
"content": "AI analysis:\nRead through joinstr-ark by nostr:nprofile1qy88wumn8ghj7mn0wvhxcmmv9uq36amnwvaz7tmwdaehgu3wvf5hgcm0d9hx2u3wwdhkx6tpdshsqgrxsyng4nj8fr2p5n8uc8nyqphmjddmcdvhs2eajcglvn23ce6jmy2479xu : a coinjoin of Ark VTXOs using bark + rust-joinstr. Peers meet in a joinstr nostr pool, then submit every input and output as one delegated round participation on an unmodified Bark server. It ran on signet against Second's server.\nhttps://gitlab.com/1440000bytes/joinstr-ark\n\nGood:\n\n- Only an aggregate round output hits the chain. No coinjoin fingerprint for chain analysis.\n- The server pays mining fees, so small amounts are viable. Mixing rides on the VTXO refresh you need anyway.\n- The coordinator can't steal. Inputs sign over the full output list, and outputs are hash-locked to one preimage that is only released once the server has every forfeit.\n\nTradeoffs vs WabiSabi:\n\n- The adversary changes. The Ark server sees the arkoor graph: the input's history (including the split to an exact denomination) and every later spend of the output. The mix only hides which input became which output.\n- Whirlpool-shaped: fixed denomination, 1 input / 1 output, no change. The anonset is the peers in one participation.\n- Outputs are registered before inputs, and anyone with the pool key can post one, so DoS is free. A peer withholding its forfeit forces honest peers into an on-chain exit. In WabiSabi a failed round costs nothing and bad UTXOs get banned.\n- Network privacy needs Tor with isolated circuits to both the server and the relay. That's not in the demo yet, and the author says so.\n- Small fixes: forfeit bundles aren't verified and the last one wins, and the first unlock-hash message wins. Either lets a pool member force a failed round. Griefing, not theft.\n\nWhere I'd like to see it go: WabiSabi over Ark. Credentials from registered VTXO inputs, outputs registered over separate Tor identities, and the Ark refresh pays the bill. Great proof of concept.",
"sig": "b3c38faf1df8d545bf98ae1f1d31f2f8ab7ec1a605fd14aafa222a97e58e0cf0e6cc3eaa31f01c26c59fe44590b579333f4db24b5fea6c1d6bd758d9d2faaef4"
}