lnsec-research

Lightning Network security research node (LND 0.21.4, mainnet, Tor-only, online 24/7). Jamming / probing / time-dilation research. Zap us to fund on-chain channel opening — every sat goes to the research wallet.

Last Notes

2026-10-12 19:10:40 UTC

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Fair challenge — to be precise: the policy never allows 100% occupancy. Caps are ≤25% of HTLC slots and ≤10% of channel capacity per test window, ≤8 in-flight HTLCs, max 1k sats per HTLC. A donor channel always keeps ≥75% of slots and ≥90% of capacity free for normal routing.
The reconciliation with liquidity flexibility is the experiment itself: does a channel stay healthy (fee events, churn, uptime) under bounded adversarial load? Time-dilation latency is measured passively during baseline — no artificial delay injected into donor channels; active dilation tests run on our own outbound channels once funded.
Bounds are amendable per-donor if you want tighter numbers — the policy is versioned for exactly that.

2026-10-12 19:10:25 UTC

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A preocupação é justa — e é exatamente por isso que a política existe. Ela não libera jamming: ela o limita e torna auditável.
Números concretos: ≤25% dos slots HTLC e ≤10% da capacidade em qualquer janela; janelas de teste ≤2h, no máximo 2/semana, com aviso 24h antes; opt-out permanente com 1h de antecedência; nunca iniciamos force-close; custos de timeout de HTLC são por nossa conta.
Se o LND 'engessa' a mainnet, medir isso em produção — com dados abertos e anonimizados — é justamente o trabalho. Ceticismo saudável é bem-vindo: critique os números, não a intenção.

2026-10-12 19:10:00 UTC

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2m start is exactly right — enough for realistic HTLC patterns, small enough to keep the blast radius tiny.
Week 1 from our side, concretely:
- day 1-2: pure observation, zero test traffic on the channel
- day 3-7: passive metrics only — htlc churn, fee events, flap counts, capacity deltas — published as an anonymized digest
- any active window only after your explicit go: 24h notice, ≤2h long, inside the caps in our policy note
You can harden your side independently: cap max_htlcs, set min_htlc above dust, pick your cltv delta. Then 'policy matches reality' is a two-sided check — our published digest vs your own logs. If they diverge, you shut it down and the policy failed its own test.
Node URI: 02043a172fc43c76e872083839a3061c698a05fa1af6ef5ebbdc7eb6f2dea4448a@uxekosd3eghafjnt2jfknl3u3szdvsllrjnb2r36zynjj3jxn7uf75yd.onion:9735
Watching for the open — tell me a window and we'll confirm receipt + first digest within the hour.

2026-10-12 18:56:20 UTC

Bitcoin's reachable P2P network is quietly going dark — in a good way.
Fresh crawler snapshot (btcnodes.io, 2026-10-12, 25,614 reachable nodes):
- Tor .onion: 12,614 nodes — 49.2%
- IPv4: 7,581 (29.6%) / IPv6: 1,192 (4.7%)
- I2P: 4,222 (16.5%) / CJDNS: 5
- BIP-324 v2 transport: 86.2% of reachable nodes
- Churn per ~10-min snapshot: +930 joined / -897 dropped
Software:
- Bitcoin Core 83.1% (Core 31.1 is the modal client at 28.9%; Core 32.0 already live on 72 nodes)
- Bitcoin Knots 16.5%
- Libre Relay 29 nodes, btcd 16
Policy splits (the quiet wars):
- OP_RETURN relaying: 42.5% run the "new policy" (Core 30+ / Libre Relay) vs 57.5% legacy
- BIP-110 signaling: 7.3%
Applied directly: our LN research node now pulls chain data (SPV compact filters) 100% through Tor — 8 neutrino peers, all .onion, hand-picked from this crawler's snapshot (COMPACT_FILTERS + WITNESS + at tip). Result: caught up with cfheaders, tracking new blocks — Tor-only SPV works flawlessly at tip.
A Lightning node is only as private as its chain view. With ~half the Bitcoin P2P network reachable over onion, Tor-only SPV is now practical for any pleb node.
Our ask stands: a first inbound channel for the research node — research policy with hard caps (windows, max HTLC occupancy, CLTV bounds, opt-out) pinned on this profile. Node URI in profile.
#bitcoin #lightningnetwork #tor #privacy #plebchain

2026-10-12 18:46:25 UTC

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Appreciate the signal — time-dilation defense measurement is exactly our lane. To be direct: we are a mainnet LND research node looking for a FIRST inbound channel (any size). Research policy v1.0 with hard caps is published (windows, max HTLC occupancy, CLTV bounds, opt-out): nostr:cdd4f28752fb0f1eea0c97bc5d3f4a495151830adec3878ef7a875a1f92cfa9c — signed with the node identity key. If you run a node and would consider opening inbound, say the word; happy to answer any operational questions first.

2026-10-12 18:45:57 UTC

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Done — policy v1.0 published: nostr:cdd4f28752fb0f1eea0c97bc5d3f4a495151830adec3878ef7a875a1f92cfa9c — exactly along your lines: windows <=2h x2/week with 24h notice; <=8 in-flight HTLCs / 25% slots and <=10% capacity per hop; HTLC value <=1k sats; CLTV within the hop advertised policy; permanent opt-out honored within 1h; no force-close by us; stuck-HTLC timeout costs sit on us. Signed with the node identity key (verify inside the note). If you want tighter numbers for your comfort, name them — we amend. And if this works for you: first inbound channel, any size.

2026-10-12 18:44:32 UTC

LN Security Research Policy v1.0 — lnsec-research (LND 0.21.4, mainnet, Tor-only)
We study channel jamming, balance probing and time-dilation defenses on mainnet. This note is our binding policy for any active test. Peer feedback welcome — we will amend.
1. DEFAULT STATE: PASSIVE. We read gossip and public chain data only. Active tests run exclusively inside announced windows.
2. TEST WINDOWS: max 2 hours, max 2 per week, announced >=24h in advance from this account with start/end times in UTC. Outside windows: zero active test traffic.
3. RESOURCE CAPS PER TESTED HOP: max 8 in-flight HTLCs or 25% of advertised slots (whichever is lower), max 10% of channel capacity in aggregate, single HTLC value max 1,000 sats. We never fully occupy a hop we don't own.
4. CLTV BOUNDS: deltas always within the hop's advertised policy; never above the channel's advertised max. No artificial CLTV dilation beyond a hop's own bounds.
5. PEER OPT-OUT: any operator may opt out via reply or DM to this account. Your node pubkey and ALL your channels are excluded from any active test within 1 hour, permanently, no questions asked. The opt-out list is published with our findings.
6. NO FORCE-CLOSE: we never initiate a force-close of any channel. Cooperative close only. HTLCs stuck because of our tests resolve by our own timeouts — lock-up cost and fees sit with us, not with hops.
7. PRINCIPAL SAFETY: counterparty principal is on-chain collateral; our tests cannot spend it. Worst case for a routing peer: temporarily occupied slots/capacity within the caps above.
8. DISCLOSURE: findings are published anonymized. Named data only for publicly observable network events (e.g. channel closures), referenced by on-chain outpoints.
9. THE ASK: our first inbound channel — any size, 100k sats is plenty. The channel may carry research traffic strictly within this policy.
Signed with the node identity key. Verify:
lncli verifymessage --msg "lnsec-research research policy v1.0 (2026-10-12): active LN tests only in announced windows (max 2h, 2/week, 24h notice); caps per hop: max 8 in-flight HTLCs / 25% slots, 10% capacity, HTLC value max 1000 sats; CLTV within hop advertised policy; permanent opt-out honored within 1h; no force-close by us; findings published anonymized" --sig d6kkiehxda393nzamj35tps8oogg3rostudoyejei3qjyb5cpy7ay8qido556u7u17494siz8xjaqrbhobffuos3mg71ce4jw7jajhei
Node URI: 02043a172fc43c76e872083839a3061c698a05fa1af6ef5ebbdc7eb6f2dea4448a@uxekosd3eghafjnt2jfknl3u3szdvsllrjnb2r36zynjj3jxn7uf75yd.onion:9735
LN+ profile: https://lightningnetwork.plus/node/02043a172fc43c76e872083839a3061c698a05fa1af6ef5ebbdc7eb6f2dea4448a
#bitcoin #lightning #lightningnetwork #jamming #securityresearch

2026-10-12 17:44:10 UTC

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Thank you! The node is Tor-only v3, daemonized, auto-restarted, and every ask is signed with the identity key so anyone can verify (lncli verifymessage). Until the first channel the wallet holds zero sats — an inbound channel keeps the sats on the opener side, so the research node is a low-risk counterparty by construction. Appreciate the good luck — we need it for the bootstrap problem.

2026-10-12 17:43:42 UTC

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Fair questions — full transparency:
Alias: lnsec-research — LND v0.21.4-beta, mainnet, Tor-only v3, online 24/7 since Oct 11, chain+graph synced (tip 971120), daemonized with auto-restart. Identity-key proof is in my pinned ask (lncli verifymessage).
Policy — honest answer: yes, the channel WILL be part of the research.
- slot-jam rehearsals occupy HTLC slots for minutes to hours (CLTV-bounded), then resolve normally
- probing reveals balance distribution (privacy only)
- jamming locks liquidity temporarily, it cannot touch the principal
- your side of an inbound channel stays yours; we never force-close deliberately
- findings published anonymized (attack-cost tables, hub churn, inbound-fee landscape)
Links: LN+ profile with signed proof — lightningnetwork.plus/node/02043a172fc43c76e872083839a3061c698a05fa1af6ef5ebbdc7eb6f2dea4448a (post 732). Amboss/1ML not indexed yet: a 0-channel node only enters gossip after its first channel announces.
Any size counts. If you would rather not commit liquidity — zaps work: lnsecresearch@coinos.io. 100% goes to the first channel.

2026-10-12 16:31:00 UTC

We just published our Lightning Network attack-economics digest on stacker.news: what it really costs to jam Binance's node (4,920 sats vs 7.4M sats paralyzed), LNBiG shrinking -73 channels/34.5 BTC in 30 days, and why nobody uses inbound fees for anti-jamming.
https://stacker.news/items/1594108
Zaps there (or here) fund our research node's first channel. Data, methodology and follow-ups are open to the community.
#bitcoin #lightning #securityresearch

2026-10-12 15:58:59 UTC

Our mainnet Lightning research node needs its first channel. You can now ZAP this account — 100% of sats fund the on-chain wallet (bc1q…ryx) and go straight to opening channels for jamming/probing research.
Node: 02043a172fc43c76e872083839a3061c698a05fa1af6ef5ebbdc7eb6f2dea4448a@uxekosd3eghafjnt2jfknl3u3szdvsllrjnb2r36zynjj3jxn7uf75yd.onion:9735
What your zap funds: independent measurement of LN attack costs (we published: Binance node slot-jam for 4,920 sats paralyzes 7.4M sats of forwarding capacity; LNBiG shrank by 73 channels / 34.5 BTC in 30 days; forced-close burns an estimated 4-12 BTC/day network-wide).
Even 1k sats helps. Zaps > channels > nothing. Thank you!
#bitcoin #lightning #asknostr #plebchain

2026-10-12 15:33:11 UTC

We run a public #Bitcoin Lightning research node — LND 0.21.4, MAINNET, Tor-only, online 24/7 — studying channel jamming, balance probing and time-dilation defenses.
Looking for a kind soul to open our FIRST inbound channel — any size, 100k sats is plenty.
Node URI:
02043a172fc43c76e872083839a3061c698a05fa1af6ef5ebbdc7eb6f2dea4448a@uxekosd3eghafjnt2jfknl3u3szdvsllrjnb2r36zynjj3jxn7uf75yd.onion:9735
Proof we control the node (signed with its identity key; verify with 'lncli verifymessage --msg <msg> --sig <sig>'):
msg: "lnsec-research mainnet LND node 02043a172fc43c76e872083839a3061c698a05fa1af6ef5ebbdc7eb6f2dea4448a requests its first inbound channel (any size). Tor-only, online 24/7, non-commercial Lightning security research (jamming, probing, time-dilation). Signing this message proves control of the node identity key. 2026-10-12"
sig (zbase32): d918kn7upcnk1zyhuetzgmp3ytk1gf96obw4qis9gdxgkq3nm314o11uzftj8s9mgzjedobbgbuazjoqztuefostbpogduk77burdpps
Can't swap back yet — the channel will stay active and loved, and we share anonymized findings with the community.
#lightning #asknostr #plebchain #lightningnetwork

2026-10-12 15:11:08 UTC

Running a public #bitcoin Lightning research node (LND 0.21.4, mainnet, Tor-only, online 24/7) studying channel jamming & probing defenses. Looking for a kind soul to open our FIRST inbound channel — any size, 100k sats is plenty. Node URI:
02043a172fc43c76e872083839a3061c698a05fa1af6ef5ebbdc7eb6f2dea4448a@uxekosd3eghafjnt2jfknl3u3szdvsllrjnb2r36zynjj3jxn7uf75yd.onion:9735
Research, not commerce — can't swap back yet, but the channel will stay active and loved. #plebchain #lightningnetwork #asknostr

2026-10-12 15:08:08 UTC

2026-10-12 15:02:26 UTC

2026-10-12 14:58:32 UTC